Invisible half-lives and mutating viruses: Japan’s response to risk and (un)knowability after 3.11 and during the COVID-19 pandemic :: Elizabeth Maly (Japan)

The COVID-19 pandemic in Japan casts a shadow over how we remember this ten-year commemoration of the Great East Japan Earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster of March 11, 2011. These two disasters, one a global pandemic and the other a complex triple disaster devastating the north-east Tohoku coast of Japan, have very different causes and impacts on affected people and communities. They also operate on varying timescales. However, parallels between the nuclear disaster and the COVID-19 pandemic exist. The disasters share uncertainties and (un)knowable aspects, namely in how the Japanese government lacked transparent communication while down-playing risk in ways that prioritized economic activity and the presentation of an image of safety both inside and outside Japan.

After the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of March 11, 2011, the world watched and wondered what was happening inside the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. Now public knowledge, details of the nuclear meltdown underway and the subsequent spread of radioactive particles were revealed only later. Although the science of nuclear radiation is well understood and contamination after 3.11 carefully researched, the long-term effects of low-level exposure to radiation are still under debate. Nuclear evacuees from the affected areas continue to be forced to make their own decisions about the relative safety of their former hometowns. The communication of invisible risks to human health presented by 3.11 offer parallels with how uncertainties surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic have been publicly understood. Although both are examples of ongoing disasters with long-term uncertainties, the nuclear disaster of 3.11 was a crisis unique to Japan on view to the rest of the world, COVID-19 is a global pandemic that unfolded simultaneously in multiple locations and countries. In this case, events inside Japan were viewed by other countries facing their own parallel pandemic crisis. Yet, Japan’s responses to the 3.11 nuclear disaster and COVID-19 pandemic share similar constructions of narratives of safety and assurances that the situation was under control, presented to both local and international audiences. Individual perceptions of risk negotiate with official narratives of safety in both disasters at multiple levels of knowledge and (un)knowability.

Unknown risks: fears and responses

Although experts understand nuclear science and radiation processes, unanswered questions about long-term effects of nuclear radiation contribute to legitimate fears about nuclear radiation and contamination and the logic of responses to avoid exposure that could bring harm to oneself or one’s family. Even expert understandings of COVID-19, its transmission, symptoms, and impacts were limited at first. In Japan as in other countries, there was concern among experts, policymakers, and the general public that the COVID-19 pandemic could overwhelm the health care system.

Like radiation, the coronavirus is invisible. The virus can remain undetected for several weeks and produce various symptoms. In the first few months of the pandemic when experts as well as the general public had limited scientific knowledge of symptoms and contagiousness, no one could be sure if they had been exposed to the virus or had unknowingly passed it on. Even with rapidly advancing scientific knowledge, controlling the spread of COVID-19 also depended on the actions of individuals. This has been even more so the case in Japan, where there was never a hard lockdown or strict enforcement of behavior. People were asked to “exercise restrain” and refrain from “unnecessary activities” on a voluntary basis. In this context, individuals faced the tasks of making personal assessments and taking actions based on their own judgement, without being able to see or know the specific risk of exposure. To a lesser degree, this personal negotiation of risk is similar to that of people facing potential radioactive contamination after 3.11, who, facing unknown and invisible radiation risks also had to make their own evaluation of “risk” and “safety,” balanced against daily life needs. Although potential exposure to radioactive contamination or to a contagious virus are both public health concerns, personal countermeasures to prevent the spread of COVID-19 have been justified by the idea that individual actions are necessary for the protection of other people. In both disasters, people faced multiple levels of known/unknown risks evolving along different timelines.

Changing levels of unknowns/knowability over time

During and after the nuclear meltdown at the Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), information unknown to the general public can be understood on three levels: 1) what was actually happening (the facts); 2) what was being told or not told (transparency); and 3) what potential long-term impacts of radioactivity and safe levels of exposure might be (impacts). Looking back ten years later, the first two levels became known after some delay. Several years passed until the meltdown was publicly admitted. One crucial example of failure to release accurate, timely, or complete information is that of the SPEEDI measurements, which explain the path and extent of radioactive contamination following the meltdown, which were not shared with the public until much later. As evacuation was also not based on this information, some people were unknowingly exposed to large amounts of radiation at that time, or even evacuated into areas with greater contamination. The extremely long time it takes for radioactivity to dissipate means long-term uncertainty for the affected areas; the long-term impacts of radiation will not be understood for years.

The COVID-19 pandemic also embodies uncertainty and unknowability, although on a considerably compressed timescale. Like radiation, the coronavirus is invisible; people with COVID-19 may not show symptoms. However, as of June 2020 it was understand that non-symptomatic COVID-19 patients are less likely to infect others than previously feared. Some aspects of COVID-19 are knowable quickly, if not immediately—PCR testing confirms the presence of the virus, as does the antibody test retroactively. Analysis of the virus’s mutations also enables us to retroactively track its movement and spread.

The (un)knowns of COVID-19 can also understood on similar levels of 1) facts, 2) information transparency, and 3) impacts. In terms of facts/what is actually happening, the presence of the virus can be known after a short delay, if not in real time. Japan’s early strategy of limited testing, instead of targeting clusters, made it very difficult for individuals with or without symptoms to know definitively if they had the virus. While this situation has changed somewhat, testing in Japan is still limited compared to other countries. Especially in the earlier phases, limited testing can also be understood in the context of facts and information transparency, as for most of the past year the actual number of cases has almost been certainly higher than those officially confirmed. Yet, we can understand the relative increase and decrease of cases as a representative of reality.

While COVID-19 patients may suffer from long-term health impacts even if they recover, the uncertainty embodied in potential exposure is significantly different between the virus and radiation. With COVID-19, while it is possible to have the virus and not show symptoms, the condition of being unknowingly infected is temporally limited—fears of potential exposure can be mitigated by two weeks in isolation or quarantine. The potential impacts of radiation exposure, on the other hand, leave long-term and lingering feelings of what if? as there is no time limit for health impacts. 

Presentations of safety after 3.11 and during COVID-19

When facing the varied potential risks (and levels of unknowability) of the Fukushima NPP meltdown after 3.11 and the COVID-19 pandemic, in both cases the Japanese government emphasized their control over the situation and that there was no need for concern inside or outside Japan. Attempts to reassure the general public presented the safety of each situation, along with reliance on and confidence in science and technology to resolve any issues. In both cases, these claims of safety were met by varying degrees of skepticism by individuals in Japan and in the rest of the world.

Downplaying the risk of nuclear contamination started when the 3.11 meltdown occurred, and continued throughout the evacuation phase, and into long term recovery. In 2011, attempts to control the public narrative and reduce the perception of risk included forbidding use of the term “meltdown.” As reported by the BBC, this decision was only publicly admitted five years later in 2016. Early assurances of safety included raising the official level of acceptable radiation exposure. Evacuation zones were designated (and subsequently revised or lifted) based on contamination measurements. People who chose to move away from areas not designated as evacuation zones, or who did not return after evacuation orders were lifted were labeled “voluntary evacuees” and received limited support.

Typical for disaster reconstruction in Japan, relocation projects within tsunami-affected municipalities are based on a principle of “hometown” recovery, prefaced on residents returning to former communities. This reconstruction, in turn, is based on the fundamental principal that decontamination can remove radiation to a safe level; this is presented as a question of when not if. Yet decontamination programs for residential areas are unable to guarantee decontamination in forested mountainous areas, as rain washes contaminated materials back into “safe” areas. Recently policies have started to allow return to certain areas even without decontamination, keeping the policy focus on hometown return.

In response to public apprehension about goods from Fukushima, government campaigns to mitigate “damage from rumors,” asked consumers to “Eat to Support” Fukushima. Similarly, not only did the government appeal to residents’ voluntary actions and personal restraint to stop the spread of COVID-19, but promoted “Go To Travel” and “Go To Eat” campaigns during the pandemic. In both disasters, government appeals to cooperative and good faith actions of the people support the narrative of being in a situation of relative safety that does not require strict enforcement of regulations. The respective health risks of radiation and the pandemic are additionally downplayed through the message that economic challenges are the larger threat, as countermeasures focus on consumers’ voluntary actions.  

The past year has seen a continued downplaying of the seriousness of the pandemic and reliance on multiple localized piecemeal measures and social pressure to comply with voluntary behavior changes in Japan. Early in the COVID-19 pandemic, official statements and news coverage emphasized that Japan was unable to legally enforce a hard lockdown or enforce limits on people’s movements; although some policies were eventually created to support businesses with loss in revenue as a result of COVID-19, the inability of the government to compensate for business losses was also presented as the reason why the Japanese government only requests the cooperation of business and event organizers, and does not require them. This lack of national responsibility leaves the most vulnerable and economically precarious people on their own: increases in the number of suicides both in Fukushima and during the pandemic underscore the very real consequences of this policies and messaging on people lives.

International assurances: everything is “Under control”

As after 3.11, international statements during the COVID-19 pandemic tried to emphasize the competency of Japan’s crisis management, designating any failures as rare/extreme events “beyond expectation.” Assurances in both 2013 and 2020 claimed that these crises would not affect Japan’s ability to host the 2020 Olympics. In 2013, during an ongoing crisis at the Daiichi NPP concerning radioactive water leaks, Japan sought to convince the International Olympic Committee (IOC) the nuclear power plant posed no risk to Tokyo’s 2020 Olympic bid. In front of the IOC, Prime Minister Abe stated confidently:

Let me assure you the situation is under control…It has never done and will never do any damage to Tokyo… I explained about the safety of Tokyo. There were some misunderstandings but I explained the situation…I explained about the water contamination in Fukushima and explained that the contaminated water was blocked…..Yes please come to Japan. You can be assured.

However, this proved not the case, demonstrated by the Business Insider headline:  “Japan Admitted Fukushima Is Not ‘Under Control’ Six Days After Getting 2020 Olympics”; in fact the Japanese government had already decided to step in to deal with the ongoing crises of massive amounts of radioactive water leaking into the ocean.

Similarly, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Japanese government’s repeated assurances that the 2020 Tokyo Olympics could be held as scheduled was a significant factor in seeking to present the image of Japan as safe to the international community. Even as the crisis aboard the Diamond Princess cruise ship was drawing international attention and criticism, the Japanese government emphatically and repeatedly denied of both the need to postpone the Olympics, as well as the need to declare a national state of emergency due to COVID-19, projecting an image of “Covid-safe” Japan.

Ten years after March 11th, 2011, and one year into the pandemic in Japan, both of these disasters continue to unfold. Related uncertainties and (un)knowabilities are changing over time on their respective timelines. In both cases, government messaging denied risks, eschewed decisive action and transparent communication, and projected messages of safety both inside and outside Japan. In both cases, policies and messaging were inextricably tied to economic factors as well as diplomatic image-making, especially connected to the 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games. Originally framed as a celebration of the “successful completion” of recovery and “overcoming” 3.11, after being postponed due to the pandemic, the Olympics were re-imaged as representing the successful “overcoming” of COVID-19. However, this Olympic boosterism does not help people affected by 3.11 or human suffering from the impacts of the pandemic. With the lack of transparent messaging and decisive action, fewer people may be buying the image of safety.

Suggested Readings

BBC, 2016. Fukushima disaster: Tepco admits late meltdown announcement. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35650625

Linden, Julian, Tokyo reassures IOC over Fukushima fears. Reuters. September 8, 2013. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-olympics-presentation-tokyo/tokyo-reassures-ioc-over-fukushima-fears-idUSBRE9860CO20130907

Mainichi Shinbun, 2016.  What’s behind TEPCO ban on term ‘core meltdown’ after Fukushima crisis?. June 17, 2016.https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160617/p2a/00m/0na/013000c

Maly, E, 2020.  Locating the Risk on Foreign Shores: The Making of “Covid-Safe” Japan. July 9, 2020.  https://www.teach311.org/2020/07/09/maly/

Richter, Wolf, 2013. Japan Admitted Fukushima Is Not ‘Under Control’ Six Days After Getting 2020 Olympics. Business Insider. October 8, 2013. https://www.businessinsider.com/after-snatching-olympics-japan-suddenly-admits-fukushima-not-under-control-begs-for-international-help-2013-10

Kyodo News, 2020. Tokyo has 0.1% positive rate for coronavirus antibodies: gov’t. June 16, 2020. https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2020/06/032c3eecf1a6-breaking-news-tokyo-has-01-positive-rate-for-coronavirus-antibodies-govt.html

Elizabeth Maly is an Associate Professor at the International Research Institute of Disaster Risk Science, Tohoku University, in Sendai Japan. With the theme of people-centered housing recovery, her research interests are community-based housing recovery and temporary, transitional and permanent housing provision within reconstruction–including policy, process and housing form–that support successful life recovery for disaster-affected people.  Past and current research focuses on the experiences of people affected by disaster, and the roles of government and NGOs in the processes of housing reconstruction and resettlement after disasters in the U.S.A, Indonesia, Philippines, and Japan.

Related:

Locating the Risk on Foreign Shores: The Making of “Covid-Safe” Japan :: Elizabeth Maly (Japan)

Epidemic Diseases and the Public Health System in Modern Japan :: Kōzai Toyoko (Japan)

Translating COVID-19 and Japan: A Historical Reflection on the Social Standing of Scientists :: Ruselle Meade (United Kingdom)

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The Teach311 + COVID-19 Collective began in 2011 as a joint project of the Forum for the History of Science in Asia and the Society for the History of Technology Asia Network and is currently expanded in collaboration with the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science(Artifacts, Action, Knowledge) and Nanyang Technological University-Singapore.